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I. ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to summarize the foundation, intent, 
development, and continuing research into the utilization of 
analogic . reasoning for artificial intelligence, including 
construction of expert systems. Al though the concept of 
analogy, or inferring similariities between two situations, 
has been promoted as an important learning mechanism for 
centuries by philosophers, the development of computational 
models to simulate this element of human cognition is rela-
ti vely new. Partially due to the lack of a strong, single, 
comprehensive theory regarding the workings of analogy in 
humans, several directions have been pursued by researchers 1n 
hopes that their efforts will result in a model that will 
produces behaviors correspondent to observed human perfor-
mance. It is also hoped that the emergence of a competent 
computational solution will enable researchers in the knowl-
edge acquisition area to remove some of the cumbersome 
barriers to truly intelligent expert systems. 
At the core of the significant issues are the discussions 
of base concepts such as similarity, causality, relevance, and 
semantics. The subtle differences in interpretation of these 
words has spawned multiple approaches to solving the problem 
of determining if two situations are indeed 'like' each other 
and, if so, what additional similarities may be discerned from 
the initial mappings. The selection of appropriate source 
analogues, the determination of the basis for comparison, and 
1 
the thr~shold for making decisions to ultimately accept or 
reject a source as sufficiently similar, are all crucial 
. issues. 
Although not exhaustive, analysis of theoretical work by 
Carbonell, Gentner, Greiner, Holland et all, Russell, and 
Winston is presented with attention focused on the significant 
aspects of their approaches. In addition, some of the 
controversial problem areas which 
. 
remain . in the field of 
analogical 
. 
reasoning are explored, with suggestions as to 
potential avenues for future research. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
A system (biological or mechanical) is said to 
learn if it can modify its behavior after a set 
of experiences such that it can perform a task 
more accurately or more efficiently than before 
or perform a new task beyond its previous capa-
bilities. 1 
The process of learning can conceivably be classified as 
one of the greatest mysteries of all time. Every human being 
who has walked on this earth has encountered and wrestled with 
it until he has departed from existence. Still, the mechanism 
which humans employ to observe, codify, store, and ultimately 
implement their knowledge remains largely misunderstood by the 
very people who utilize this process daily. For the past 
fifty years, researchers have attempted to build theoretica.l 
and computational models of the human learning system. The 
directions of these efforts have greatly diverged and intensi-
fied, fueled by increasingly powerful computer architectures, 
astonishing leaps in hardware capabilities, and the fruits of 
prior research efforts in machine learning. Despite the 
diversity of published literature, the focus of interest is on 
three interrelated goals: modeling of human cognition, 
improving the performance of predetermined tasks, and the 
1Jaime G. Carbonell, "Derivational Analogy: A Theory of 
Reconstructive Problem Solving and Expertise Acquisition", 
Machine Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, Vol. 
II, edited by Ryszard s. Michalski, Jaime G. Carbonell, and 
Tom M. Mitchell (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kauffman Publishers, 
Inc., 1986), p. 386. 
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exploration and discovery of ill-defined or new problem 
spaces. 
Representation of the human thinking process has long 
been the subject of study by psychologists, biologists, 
philosophers, logicians, and now, AI researchers. A success-
ful model would enable better understanding of how 
. 
various 
factors, internal and external, affect the ability to acquire 
and recall facts and skills, and to formulate abstract 
principles and concepts. Human behavioral patterns could be 
reanalyzed in light of how information processing affects 
their judgment. Better systems of education could be con-
structed by knowing what stimulates and what degrades the 
learning process. Secondly, paths could be explored which 
enable more efficient learning by humans. Human learning is 
a tediously slow process which may be improved via computer 
modeling. Alternative pathways of accessing, storing, and 
retrieving information could be objectively constructed and 
evaluated, taking into account current methodologies and 
evaluating the degree of difficulty humans would have in 
adapting to new frameworks of learning previously unexplored. 
Improving performance of predetermined tasks is an 
exercise in optimizing the process by which humans perform a 
function after they have already learned how to do it the 
first time. It may be possible to eliminate dead ends and 
reroute channels of thinking, thus improving the human capacity 
to store more optimized internal structures for subsequent 
4 
recall and application. The end product of this ~ould allow 
humans to increase the efficiency and quality of repetitious 
work. While allowing for the benefit to the human population, 
achieving this goai would also permit the construction of 
'smart' machines which could perform human tasks in areas 
which are burdensome to humans or which pose significant 
health or physical danger threats. 
The third goal of machine learning, exploration or 
discovery of domain knowledge, alludes to machine analysis of 
data for the purpose of extending it or recombining it in some 
manner not previously considered. Also, exploration involves 
finding new relationships between existing information and 
thereby filling in gaps in application domains. This is not 
to say that this process would replace the human effort in 
research; rather, machine learning in this respect would form 
a new partnership between man's imagination and a machine's 
capacity for knowledge acquisition/construction which becomes 
more than the sum of the individual components. 
An introduction to inductive reasoning complete with a 
broad description of general characteristics of induction is 
presented in chapter 3 . Chapter 4 intends to discuss the 
current state of general expert systems development, the 
shortcomings thereof, and a proposal for analogical reasoning 
as a methodology to correct those problems. Next, there is a 
detailed presentation of the different classifications of 
analogy, and explanation of many of the common components of 
5 
analogy in chapter 5. Several of the more celebrated computa-
tional approaches to developing systems based on analogy, 
including Carbonell, Gentner, Greiner, Holyoak, Russell, and 
Winston, are analyzed in chapter 6. In chapter 7, scime of the 
ongoing problems and areas for continued research are high-
lighted. Finally, chapter 8 provides some concluding remarks 
on the future of analogical reasoning as a study in itself, as 
wel 1 as a component of induction and as an application to 
future expert systems design and construction. 
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III. A GENERAL DISCUSSION ABOUT INDUCTIVE REASONING 
Scientific knowledge through demonstration is 
impossible unless a man knows the primary im-
mediate processes We must get to know the 
primary premises by induction; for the method 
by which even sense perception implants the 
universal is inductive. 2 
One of the primary tasks in machine learning is that of 
building extensive and complete knowledge bases which may be 
then applied to solve problems. Induction is an inferencing 
method which has received growing attention because of its 
classical treatment in psychological research with regards to 
human learning. Basically, the process involves observation 
of some raw data from examples and observations, formulations 
of reasonable hypotheses about this data, and assimilation of 
these hypotheses into the existing knowledge space. This data 
can then be applied 1n problem-solving situations. In 
automated induction, the goal 1s to generate plausible 
explanations for the given facts which can also be used to 
explain new facts. There are three general objectives then 
for induction: to assist in the automated construction of 
knowledge bases for expert systems which will apply this data; 
to help refine existing knowledge bases, filling in gaps and 
creating strong relationships between elements in the system; 
2Ryszard s. Michalski, "A Theory and Methodology of 
Inductive Learning", Machine Learning: l\n Artificial Intelli-
gence Approach, edited by Ryszard S. Michalski, Jaime G. 
Carbonell, and Tom M. Mitchell (Palo Alto: Tioga Publishing 
Company, 1983), p. 83. 
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and to assist the user in detecting interesting or revealing 
structures or patterns 1n the knowledge. 
Because the term induction is so broad and can encompass 
any of a number of theoretical approaches, it would be helpful 
to state a generalized paradigm as a framework. There are 
four components to this process, and they are as follows: 
1) Some initial information in the form of facts, 
observations, situations, etc. are presented to 
the system. 
2) A tentative inductive assertion must be stated. 
3) Background knowledge which contains relevant 
domain information as well as constraints on 
the data from 1) is presented. This may in-
clude desired features in the assertion. 
4) Based on the previous three inputs, the system 
attempts to generate an inductive assertion 
which satisfies the given constraints and 
implies the observational data. 3 
It should be noted that an infinite number of hypotheses may 
be made about the situation which satisfy the constraints, and 
an important subgoal for induction is to pare the hypotheses 
to the one or few most plausible ones. These inductive 
assertions can only evaluate to a probabilistic hypothesis, 
because it cannot be proven that the facts were deterministic-
ally derived from the hypothesis. Therefore, some methods 
3Ibid, pp. 88-89. 
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must be established to impose constraints on the proposed 
assertions for purposes of limiting the number under consider-
ation. 
In addition to the abstract problem schema given above, 
there are two other characteristics which are shared to some 
degree among the various inductive methodologies. Competence 
is the ability to generate output from the problem description 
that successfully captures all conditions associated with it . 
Performance . lS the ability to efficiently represent and 
process descriptions of the problem to achieve a competent 
solution. Each contributes to the formulation of structures 
which may be used to encapsulate data or provide guidelines 
for procedures so that the inductive process becomes more 
manageable. 
Domain knowledge can be characterized as a default 
hierarchy, whereby the attributes which describe objects are 
grouped together into levels of abstraction. That is to say, 
top-level descriptions are composed of some attributes which 
apply to all members of a class of objects, and each succes-
sively lower level defines a more specific type of object. 
There may even be some overriding of values at the lower 
levels in the hierarchy, and attributes may be added or 
deleted, to allow fpr unique cases. This property allows the 
system to compact the representation for an object and 
ultimately makes the search for matching descriptions more 
efficient as opposed to exploring each and every individually 
9 
described instance. For example, it may not be very efficient 
to individually classify cars as separate objects based on the 
number of wheels they may have; perhaps it would be better to 
have some level of abstraction which defaults the number of 
wheels to four, with a possible override for the special case 
where there may be more or less than four wheels. Of course, 
at some level, the abstraction may become so vague as to not 
be useful in discriminating between classes of objects, but 
that is a decision that is problem-dependent. Also, the 
hierarchies are not all discrete, and objects may be members 
of multiple default hierarchies, such as our example of the 
car which may be a member of the 'transportation' and the 
'engineering' hierarchy simultaneously. This results . 1n a 
tangled default hierarchy where objects are represented by a 
complex set of class memberships. 
Another concept 1s that of rule clustering, which 
provides that domain facts which are in some way related to 
each other conceptually are linked in the induction process as 
well. Rules in this context relate to statements which 
specify some action to be taken by a system based on some 
precondition(s). They can be specified as predicate logic, 
IF-THEN condition-action statements, or some other expression, 
but they ultimately direct the flow of the process. Rule 
clusters allow data structures to be built which group 
assumptions and behaviors associated with some object or set 
of objects in a meaningful manner. In this way, dependencies 
10 
between elements may be created which eli~inate implausible 
formulations. It also allows more effective analysis of 
obje~ts as networks of interrelated features, rather than as 
isolated descriptors. This is very important when attempting 
to match the input observations to stored knowledge represen-
tations, because the degree of confidence in the induction i.s 
increased as the number of matched characteristics goes up 
(and especially matches on whole sets of features which define 
an object) . 
Background information, as stated before in the paradigm, 
plays a role of varying importance in the guidance of the 
inference process. This information may be descriptive data 
about object ·attributes or characteristics, assumptions about 
the kinds of hypotheses that may be formed about an object, 
desirable or preferred properties of an object or its asser-
tions, and procedures which govern the behavior of an object. 
These types of data should be present and measurable in 
observed class instances. Descriptive information can be 
classified as either independent (no structure relates the 
values within the domain), linear (totally-ordered, as in a 
set of numbers) , or structured (which creates layers of 
generalization) . 4 Descriptors may be characterized addition-
ally by their interdependence, properties, and interrelation-
ships. Because of the possibility for unlimited numbers of 
descriptors and/or relationships between descriptors, a set of 
4Ibid, p. 99. 
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preferred properties can highlight certain identifying traits 
of a domain. Preference may be defined in many different 
ways, some of which may include simplicity in number of terms 
or relationships, efficiency or economy of representation or 
processing, or degree of fit between the observable instances 
and the inductive assertions. The importance of any of these 
criteria, or the forms which these criteria assume, are 
partially dependent on the specific domain. This knowledge 
serves to constrain the number and kinds of data that will be 
considered during the learning process, and also becomes a 
model based on previous experience upon which the new informa-
tion may be evaluated. 
Since any new observation or situation may not syntacti-
cally match what is already stored in the knowledge base, or 
there may be unique characteristics which are not explicitly 
present, the system must provide synchronic and diachronic 
relations for processing the data. A synchronic relation is 
one in which the data may be reformulated or recategorized 
into some other form. It can provide modifications to the 
hierarchical specification (class membership) or the associa-
tions with other objects (such as activation of related 
concepts) . The diachronic relation, on the other hand, . 1S 
one in which the data is altered in some discernible way so 
that the inference procedure may be more apt to use it. 
Diachronic rules may be classified as predictive (specifies 
something which will happen in future time) or effective 
12 
(causes the system to act) . 5 See Table 1 for illustrations 
of these kinds of rules. 
Finally, inductive systems have the capacity for revising 
parameters and generating new rules in the system. These 
tools are very powerful in that they extend the knowledge in 
the system beyond what was provided for initially. Rules may 
be generalized or specialized, or attribute descriptions may 
be expanded or modified to allow new observations to be 
included in the domain specifications. New rules may be 
created by combining multiple existing rules or creating 
several specialized rules from a single rule. In this way, 
the system can 'learn' from each new properly-classified 
observation and create a more comprehensive description of the 
problem domain. An example of such capacity can be found in 
a system which attempts to build descriptions of all living 
animals. A general description of 'animal' may be created 
from observations of a giraffe, but additional rules and 
parameters must be derived when the system encounters a bear 
as the next input stream. In this way, the learning mechanism 
may use each new encountered instance as a teaching experi-
ence. 
So far, what has been established is that induction is an 
• 
approach to creating, modifying and utilizing input data from 
5John H. Holland, Keith J. Holyoak, Richard E. Nisbett, 
and Paul R. Thagard, Induction: Processes of Inference, 
Learning, and Discover (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986), 
p. 42. 
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some source to maintain some knowledge base. Furthermore, the 
process of evolving this knowledge base bears some resemblance 
to the human process of learning by observing the world around 
him. This is not to say, of course, that induction is the 
only way of learning because other methods are certainly 
val id, such as learning by being told or learning by rote 
memorization. However, much of the human learning process is 
carried out by assimilating new knowledge into the existing 
knowledge base (the brain) via some mechanism for comparing it 
to stored experiences. Often, the input differs in some 
constrained manner from other similar situations he may have 
encountered before. The process then is to decide what the 
similarities are between the situations, which may include the 
context of the situation, the data that are involved, and the 
process for resolving the discrepancies. A rather concrete 
example of this type of thinking happens when encountering 
driving a truck for the first time, as when renting a moving 
van. A person who has had experience with only driving cars 
may not feel at ease with the peculiarities of a truck, but 
may notice that certain controls such as steering wheel, gas 
and brake pedals, emergency brake, and gauges are familiar to 
him from his prior automotive experience. Through a process 
of comparing the similarities between the truck and his car, 
he may deduce enough so that he may drive the truck, however 
inexpertly, to his appointed destination. Of course, it is 
entirely possible that, since he has never encountered air 
14 
brakes on an automobile, he may not be able to stop the truck 
and have an unfortunate mishap. It is on this note that the 
concept of inductive inferencing by analogy is presented as a 
human trait, and that the computational implementation of this 
trait becomes an important component of the machine learning 
research. Since a secondary goal of this paper is to indicate 
how analogical reasoning may be applied to expert systems 
development in order to solve some of the existing problems in 
that area, an overview of the current state of expert systems 
is now presented before continuing on with further discussion 
as regards analogy. 
One of the best-known and perhaps most commercially-
successful end products of artificial intelligence research 
has been the creation of expert systems. The expert system is 
intended to capture the breadth and depth of knowledge from 
those who have achieved distinction in a particular domain. 
The primary objective is to encapsulate the expertise in such 
a way that the knowledge is accessible to all who require or 
desire it, without requiring the presence of the human expert 
himself. This is especially important in domains where the 
knowledge is exceptionally specialized or complex, or where 
there are few who possess the knowledge. The expert system 
serves as a model of the accumulated learning process by which 
the domain expert has attained his current level of under-
standing. 
15 
The current characterization of expert systems develop-
~ent is simple on an abstract level: the knowledge engineer 
extracts the information from the targeted expert, whether by 
personal ir1terviews or via some automated knowledge acquisi-
tion tool, and encodes the information into some form which 
then is uploaded to a knowledge base. The basic issue, of 
course, is to establish a well-formed body of knowledge which 
covers all the possible real-world situations. Typically, the 
form of the information is stated as condition-action, or IF-
THEN, rules. As the knowledge base grows, these rules are 
added to or modified as the expert reviews the performance of 
the system in test cases. The system is a byproduct of the 
information which is extracted from him; there may be less, 
but there will be no more than what he has communicated to the 
knowledge engineer. The data in the system is a closed body 
of facts and relations based on what the expert can retrieve 
from his inner store of domain understanding. Current systems 
are rather unhelpful when confronted with situations that are 
outside their area of specialization, or for which no complete 
solution may be found. It is particularly galling to encoun-
o, 
ter systems which provide not even a clue as to potential or 
partial solutions when they cannot provide a satisfactory 
answer. The user feels somewhat abandoned to his own intu-
ition as to how to proceed from that point. 
While there have been several examples of systems which 
have performed well in this environment (Rl, MYCIN and 
16 
DENDRAL, among others), there are several shortcomings to this 
type of development. First, the process of extracting this 
information from the expert and trans·lating it is excruciat-
ingly long, and becomes more so with the increasing complexity 
of the domain and/or the lack of availability of the human 
expert. Several leading researchers in have lamented that 
knowledge acquisition . 1s the bottleneck to expert systems 
development, and thus new ways are being theorized and 
implemented to speed up this process. As the system becomes 
larger, the management of these systems also becomes horren-
dous. Small changes to the rule base have ripple effects 
throughout the entire system, and evaluating the impacts of 
modifications becomes more difficult. The real world also 
does not always present clear-cut and complete data for 
analysis, such as in medical diagnosis where certain patient 
information may be risky to obtain or unknown. Current expert 
systems have limited abilities to handle information which 
does not match the internal representations derived from the 
expert. Sometimes, situations present themselves which the 
expert may not have encountered or which could not be elicited 
because he could not recall the . experience from memory. 
Finally, the closed body of knowledge which presented the neat 
boundaries of an expert's experience are no help when the 
input data is outside of these boundaries. Without any way to 
expand the knowledge base except additional development using 
the expert to add to the existing rule base, the system may be 
17 
forced to provide no answer at all to a user query. Even a 
partial answer may be impossible to obtain. This may not be 
acceptable . in certain situations. Certainly, there are 
efforts to find answers to these problems, so this analysis is 
not meant to state that all is lost and researchers should 
abandon the expert systems ship. Rather, it is meant to 
highlight some of the aggravations that plague developers long 
after the first blush of excitement with success. 
The use of inductive reasoning to construct and maintain 
knowledge bases has already been proposed. This paper does 
not propose to reinvent the wheel by scrapping currently-
instal led production systems or methodologies which perform 
well in order to start over with some new methodology. It 
would be a waste of time to reengineer these cases (however 
elegant or appealing the idea might be), unless the benefits 
of doing so would be so tremendous that retaining existing 
implementations would be deleterious. Machine learning 
through induction and specifically, analogy, can become a 
vital complement by which knowledge bases and entire systems 
can be built or extended, precisely because it has strengths 
where other methodologies have their weaknesses. For example, 
analogy may be used to create characterizations or abstract 
concepts from input data as opposed to having a human expert 
perform this activity. Learning can progress even in the 
absence of an available expert. Also, formulations and 
hypotheses may be made by the system from observations, rather 
18 
than have- an expert ess~ntially perform the same operation 
fro~ his prior recollections of solving past problems in the 
domain (which must then be somehow translated unambiguously 
into deductive assertions). Also, this information is pro-
cessed in the framework of information about the domain which 
is already in place; therefore, inconsistencies, gaps and even 
new relationships between data may be detected from the 
observations. Data may be added to the system because the 
inferencing mechanism looks at data within the context of 
similar situations (which may even extend beyond the relevant 
domain). Poorly-defined problems, which presented difficul-
ties to deductive systems which may have required certain 
information that was not available, may be better handled via 
analogical inferencing which fills in missing data through a 
mapping from some similarly-characterized problem. It is true 
that there are many difficult issues that must be resolved for 
this type of mechanism to be developed, and these will be 
handled later in this paper. However, it is also true that 
inductive analogy presents a great opportunity to become less 
reliant on limited and poorly-understood human expertise, and 
instead use computational advantages to advance expert systems 
beyond the limitations they now face. 
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Examples of empirical rules 
A. Synchronic 
B. 
1. Categorical 
If an object is a dog, then it is an animal. 
If an object is a large slender dog with very 
long white and gold hair, then it is a collie. 
If an object is a dog, then it can bark. 
2. Associative 
If object . dog, then activate the "cat" an lS a 
concept. 
If object . dog, then activate the "bone" an lS a 
concept. 
Diachronic 
1. Predictor 
If a person annoys a dog, then the dog will 
growl. 
If a person whistles to a dog, then the dog 
will come to the person. 
2. Effector 
If a dog chases you, then run away. 
If a dog approaches you with is tail wagging, 
then pet it. 
TABLE 1 - Synchronic and Diachronic Rules6 
6Ibid, p. 42. 
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IV. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF COMMON CHARACTERISTICS 
IN ANALOGIC MODELS 
Analogy pervades all our thinking, our 
everyday speech and our trivial conclusions 
as well as artistic ways of expression and 
the highest scientific achievements. 7 
If our hardworking knowledge engineer were to say to 
himself, 'Aha! I have seen the light. All I have to do 1s 
build myself an analogical inferencing mechanism to solve my 
knowledge acquisition problem', he would soon be confused. 
That is because within the field of inductive research itself, 
there are various debates as to the meaning and breadth of 
analogy. Based on that statement, the knowledge engineer can 
correctly infer that there are multiple approaches to building 
analogical inferencing systems. Bipin Indurkhya, one of the 
prime researchers in this area, has attempted to provide some-
clarification by defining three separate classifications of 
analogy: analogy by rendition, proportional analogy and 
predictive analogy. 8 
Analogy by rendition can be viewed as a process of 
creating similarities between two objects that were not there 
7Nachum Dershowitz, "Programming by Analogy", Machine 
Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, Vol. II, edited 
by Ryszard s. Michalski, Jaime G. Carbonell, and Tom M. 
Mitchell (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kauffman Publishers, Inc., 
1986), p. 395. 
8Bipin Indurkhya, "Modes of Analogy", 
Inductive Inference, edited by K. P. Jantke, 
Artificial Intelligence, No. 397 (Berlin: 
1989), p. 226. 
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Analogical and 
Lecture Notes in 
Springer-Verlag, 
before the process began. It can also be stated as looking at 
an object as if it were another bbject. An example of this 1s 
found in a case study by Schon regarding a product development 
team attempting to improve the performance of synthetic fiber 
paint brushes; they viewed the paint brush as a pump and 
imported features from the characterization of pumps to paint 
brushes9 • A process of interpretation is invoked to analyze 
a situation in a conceptual framework which may th~n be trans-
ported to another situation; attributes and symbols are copied 
as an isomorphic system. It . lS, . 1n a very real sense, 
creative problem-solving, and is full of capacity for failure 
as the interpretation is not based on any existing similari-
ties between descriptions of situations. One of the most 
perplexing dilemmas is that of choosing an appropriate source 
which can be mapped correctly onto the new situation. Not 
surprisingly, despite the novelty of the approach, it has not 
been the subject of widespread research except for theoretical 
studies by Polya, Gordon, Schon and Koestler; implementation 
of Erman's HEARSAY II speech understanding system; and 
portions of machine vision systems proposed independently by 
Riseman & Hanson and Weymouth. 10 
Proportional analogy has not been treated any more 
favorably. It is based on the idea that, given a four term 
statement of the form 'A is to Bas C is to D', the objective 
9Ibid, pp. 217-218. 
10Ibid, p. 226. 
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is to derive the fourth term based on the relations of the 
other three. This type of analogy requires an element of 
interpretation to understand the roles that the various parts 
of the relation play, before deriving a conclusion as to the 
correct correspondent value for the fourth term. There has 
been some debate as to whether or not this type of analogy can 
be carried out on strictly a syntactic level, as when perform-
ing analogies on geometric figures. 11 However, the interre-
lationships between pieces of the figures may need to be 
interpreted before successfully carrying out the analogical 
transfer (Gentner did have some success in performing analogy 
on a syntactic level without resorting to semantic interpreta-
tion). Each of the three components contributes somehow to 
the context in which the fourth element is defined. An 
example of this process is given in Figure 1, which shows 
various analogies based on different interpretations of the 
\ Star of David. One description of form A may be two inverted 
intersecting triangles; another may be a hexagon with an 
equilateral triangle on each side. The description is formed 
by creating higher-level concepts from lower-level concepts, 
which may in turn be defined by other lower-level concepts. 
Within this type of analogy are two subclassifications: 
syntactic and interpretive. The principal difference between 
the two is whether or not the natural description for an" 
object (every object is viewed under some perspective from 
11 Ibid, pp. 219-220. 
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some description) must be altered or redefined to be properly 
comprehended. If the analogy may be understood without 
changing the description, such as in geometric forms, then the 
analogy is syntactic. However, i.f there must be some redescr-
iption in order to make the analogy work, it is considered 
interpretive. 12 The view of whether a particular analogy is 
syntactic or interpretive is really decided from the perspec-
tive of the analyzer, and may be different depending on the 
individual. Hesse and Evans both constructed models of 
proportional syntactic analogy, but no working implementations 
have been constructed. Hofstadter addressed the interpretive 
issue, but has not yet created a working implementation. 13 
The third type of analogy, predictive analogy, has 
enjoyed the most success in both theoretical and practical 
research. It is the process of inferring, or predicting, 
further similarities between two objects based on some 
initial, existing similarities between those objects. 14 The 
process begins with searching for a source situation from the 
domain which contains characteristics that are similar to the 
new, or target, situation. This raises a central issue of the 
basis for determining that one situation is like another. 
Proof that the similarities do indeed exist cannot be provid-
ed, only that the similarities are consistent with observed 
12Ibid 
' 
p. 221. 
13Ibid 
' 
p. 226. 
14Ibid, p. 222. 
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instances of the domain. Also, the quality and/or quantity of 
similarity required for the analogy to be established is an 
important question,, and one that also has no conclusive 
answer. Possibly, associated domain knowledge may impart a 
heightened belief that similarities in some respects deter-
mines similarities in other respects. An alternative approach 
proposed by some researchers alludes to the relevance of 
certain features as being a basis for determining similarity. 
Predictive analogy is a category of inductive reasoning that 
has been theorized on and modeled by many interested . scien-
tists, including Agassi, Carbonell, Carnap, Gentner, Gick & 
Holyoak, King, Russell and Weitzenfeld to name but a few. 
Because of the extensive research into this kind of analogy, 
much of the remainder of the paper will focus on this area. 
Even within a category such as predictive analogy, much 
variation can occur between approaches. It would be helpful 
to define some common characteristics that are shared among 
many different models. The four major topics are: goal 
specification, source selection, element mapping and mapping 
extension. These are described in some depth before proceed-
. 1ng to analyze some of the 
. 
maJor contributing works to 
analogical inference. 
Goal specification can most simply be described as the 
statement of the desired output of the system. The user has 
a problem that needs to be stated in terms of facts and 
relations which are to be retrieved from some relevant stored 
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experience: it may take the form of data that is missing that 
he would like to infer, or some relationship between data in 
the situation that he prefers to make. Whatever the reason 
is, it is critical to the success of the inference that the 
goals be stated in a clear, nonambiguous manner. Perspective 
plays an important role in goal specification, as the same 
fact may play entirely different roles in a situation depend-
ing on the manner in which it is used. Systems do not possess 
the capacity to read human minds, so the best that can be done 
mechanically is to minimize the possibility of misinterpreta-
tion behind the request. It follows naturally that erroneous-
ly-specified problems result in misleading answers, but the 
system may possess background knowledge that will detect 
inconsistencies and may even attempt to correct the offending 
data. 
Goals are generally composed of a series of facts to be 
inferred, or some relationship between known facts which the 
user wishes to determine. The difficulty in goal interpreta-
tion lies in the capacity for potentially infinite numbers of 
facts to describe a situation, within the limits of the 
specification language. Not only can there be positive facts 
about an object ('the moon revolves around the earth') but 
also negative facts ('the moon does not revolve around 
Jupiter'). Some collections of facts can be determined to be 
more useful than others, and it becomes important that the 
known facts about the 'target' object (the facts upon which 
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the similarities are based) are associated in some relatively-
strong degree to the facts that are desired to be inferred 
(unknown facts). Relations between facts may be implicitly or 
explicitly defined, depending upon the role that domain 
knowledge plays in the inferencing. The analogical process is 
predicated upon finding similarities between one object and 
another, based upon the . given facts and those which are 
related in some way. It then becomes important to find a 
succint, precise way of specifying goals, because fewer 
extraneous datum will help to constrain the source matching 
process and make it more efficient. 
Source selection, or the process of finding an object(s) 
which are similar to the target, is probably the most mysteri-
ous and least well understood component of the entire analogi-
cal process. On an abstract level, once the goal statements 
are defined and the system has decided which information it is 
to match on, the task of finding an appropriately-defined sto-
red situation (or collection of facts) is the next major 
obstacle. One of the most difficult concepts for humans to 
grasp is ~t this search is so complex; after all, most 
people know when two objects are similar to each other. The 
human experience is to recall situations which bear strong 
resemblance to the new situation. The closer a situation is 
to some prior experience, the easier it is to recall the 
source as an appropriate analogy. However, if the new problem 
does not resemble anything encountered previously, then the 
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human has much more of a problem with constructing an analogy. 
The system, composed as it were of some collection of facts 
and relations, proceeds through the domain(s) searching for 
another collection which corresponds 
and/or semantically-constrained way. 
. 1n some structurally-
Rarely are the source 
and target specified as identical bodies of knowledge (this 
~ould be known as implicative analogy), so the process really 
involves modi.fying the form of the data to achieve a good fit 
(if there really IS a match to be found in the first place). 
The central issue is to create some logical method for the 
system to replicate the poorly-understood process by which 
humans seem to function relatively well. 
First, as alluded to before, the knowledge in a domain is 
stated as a body of facts among which some implicit and 
explicit relations exist. The basis for making a determina-
tion of a proper source object as an analogy is the similarity 
of some facts in the source to some other facts in the target. 
Depending on the depth of knowledge regarding the domain, the 
source may not represent a completely defined collection of 
facts. Missing data or even incorrectly-specified data may 
coexist with good data. Unfortunately, the inferencing system 
must attempt to find a valid match for the goal with the 
available information about the source, often within the 
boundaries of constrained resources. 
Determining the extent to which matches must be made 
between the target and a proposed source is another major 
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hurdle. It would be easy to make the blanket statement that 
all information in the target must have a corresponding match 
. . in a source, but the chance for this identity to . occur is 
rather slim. To some extent, decisions must be made as to the 
least constrained match (the 'weakest' match) that would be 
considered to determine that a similarity is justified. This 
decision is one that is made individually by each system under 
development, for there is no one right answer. Sometimes, the 
answer changes within a system depending on the situation. 
This threshold is predetermined within the system according to 
some scoring process, and the matching process either contrib-
utes to or erodes the 'belief' in a successful analogy. How 
much information is to be considered before abandoning a 
potential analogy is also an issue. Ordering of salient 
parameters, facts, or relations may help identify potential 
candidates earlier than if a random search through the 
knowledge base was utilized. 
The search process through a domain or multiple domains 
becomes more complicated with the number of facts and rela-
tions, the complexity of those facts and relations and the 
different perspectives (points of view) of the target which a 
system may use to place an analogy in perspective. There is 
certainly some limit as to the time and resources that may be 
reasonably allocated to a search, particularly in situations 
where efficient successful resolution has some tangible 
benefit. The constraint factors place some prime importance 
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on rapidly paring down the number of sources to be considered 
and focusing on those facts and relations which contribute in 
some meaningful way to achieving the goal. As domain knowl-
edge grows, any inefficiency becomes magnified. Unfortunate-
ly, constraining the search process is more of an art rather 
than a science, because each domain presents its own unique 
set of requirements for decision-making. 
Much of the research to date has focused on the limita-
tion of analogy to a single domain or a hand-tailored set of 
domains. Depending on the goals of the user and the richness 
of the domain, a single domain may be sufficient to provide 
appropriate sources that match the target. There . is no 
question that utilization of a single domain constrains the 
search process, but it also creates some bias in the system. 
On the other hand, performing interdomain searches presents 
its own set of problems. Even though using related and 
unrelated domains prov ides the system the opportunity for 
making novel and illuminating source selections, the search 
process becomes more complicated and lengthy. Pruning 
mechanisms take on greater importance as the search space 
grows. Also, since other domains may be represented as 
collections of facts that are incompatible with the data 
representation of the target domain, reformulation routines 
must become more intelligent. Reformulation is when one or 
both the source and target must have their properties modified 
to create an explicit syntactic match which 
. 
mirrors the 
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implicit properties that are common to both. Properties may 
be modified through synchronic and diachronic rules that may 
alter the level of representation (generality), exchange one 
d~scription for another equivalent one, or possibly combine 
existing properties into new ones. Therefore, the process of 
determining the extent to which source selection is enter-
tained becomes an exercise in balancing the desire to retrieve 
answers efficiently and also to provide the best opportunity 
to find the right match. 
In the traditional information systems . view, matching 
becomes a syntactic exercise. A similarity lS conceived as a 
determination that . of data . like another; . one piece 15 since 
data does not have feelings, . . . about itself, op1n1ons or views 
the relationships are characterized by the existence or 
absence of equivalence statements. Semantics for specified 
data may be implied via collections of related facts which 
comprise a homogeneous unit. Often, similarities not only 
require the presence of a particular piece of information but 
that the information is placed in a certain context. This 
forms the basis for creating views or perspectives, which may 
change as the goal changes. For example, an automobile may be 
characterized as an engineering feat, a mode of transporta-
tion, a status symbol, an expression of the owner's personali-
ty, and so on ad nauseum. Each of these views places impor-
tance on particular types of information and relations among 
them. Even in situations which may be superficially defined 
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as purely syntactic analogies, the elements of semantics may 
be buried. If the search is limited to syntactic characteris-
tics, the match process is more constrained but objects with 
the same physical descriptions may have multiple meanings. 
Therefore, the decision as to what level of 'understanding' 
the process must be carried out must be carefully weighed 
based on whether incorrect inductions may be made in the 
absence of semantic networks. It should be noted that 
complete descriptions are not always obtainable in the real 
world; it may be necessary to utilize partial matches as a 
stepping-stone to the creation of fully-specified models. The 
realization that partial matches may be the only way to make 
some headway in the search process places a greater burden on 
domain knowledge or causal relationships between data to 
provide a way of enlarging the area of activation for match-
. ing. 
Some theoretical models of analogy have placed importance 
on the similarity of the initial states from which the goal 
states are achieved between the target and the source (see 
Figure 2). The initial state has some merit in that it may 
provide some information as to preconditions and also to 
possible operations and procedures which could be activated 
from it. In this way, constraints can be constructed which 
increase the amount of available match information and also 
reduce the search space. The initial state in the source may 
help increase the degree of belief in a source as a direct 
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function of an increase in the amount of info
rmation that is 
matched. It does help constrain the search 
process to some 
degree if these conditions hold, because 
the number of 
alternative states proceeding forth from the 
initial problem 
description is reduced. However, it is somew
hat of a danger-
ous presumption that an analogy may only 
be valid if the 
source and target share initial characterizati
ons. This type 
of restriction should only be implemented in 
the full aware-
ness of the domain structure and data inte
rrelationships. 
Many types of problems which differ only sl
ightly in their 
goal specifications may have significantly di
fferent initial 
states, as well as intermediate states (the use of synch
ronic 
and/or diachronic rules may be of some ben
efit). Systems 
which provide for partial analogies may have
 a particularly 
difficult time, as only selected portions o
f the goal and 
target are matched and the initial states are 
affected by the 
preconditions which bounded them. 
Domain knowledge is a topic which is achieving
 a loftier 
status in expert systems because of the li
mitations that 
context-free analysis enforces on the relati
onships between 
data. Similarly, domain knowledge can b
e employed for 
analogical inference. Members of a particular
 domain inherit 
certain common characteristics and behavior
s which set it 
apart from other domains. These characteri
stics also help 
define the relationships between the data 
elements, and 
differentiate the ways that data may be used 
in a particular 
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context. Analogies may be constructed based not only on 
finding similar chunks of information in other objects that 
matches the target, but also in terms of what that information 
'means' and how it is used. Unfortunately, encoding domain 
.information also implies an extra level of complexity, which 
translates into additional time and effort for building and 
maintaining domain relationships. The pcisitive side of the 
argument, besides defining the context of the data more 
naturally, is that this information may be expressed as 
metaknowledge instead of being encoded explicitly in each rule 
that is fired. This metaknowledge may also become part of the 
similarity analysis when performing interdomain source 
selection. 
Constraining the search process has led researchers to 
find ways to expand the known target facts beyond that which 
is explicitly stated by the user to provide a broader compre-
hension of what these facts mean. Causal relationships are 
one way of attaining that end. They provide a context in 
which the target attribute values are derived, and may be used 
for the purpose of finding some similar context in the source. 
What this is really saying is that similar situations may tend 
to present themselves in context in a familiar way; the more 
variables that are related to the goal in some defined manner 
that can be matched, the stronger the belief in the analogy. 
There may certainly be infinitely many variables that are 
incidental to the target situation, but those that are most 
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important are those which contribute towards achieving the 
goal state. 
Synchronic and diachronic relat.ions have been briefly 
mentioned earlier. The purpose of these relations is to allow 
descriptions which do not match to be modified . in some 
constrained way so that a match can still occur. Synchronic 
relations may be referred to as synonyms, and merely exchange 
one description for another equivalent description. In this 
way, language incompatibilities may not preclude matching 
particularly in interdomain searches. Diachronic relations 
involve transforming a state into a new state by applying some 
operator. This operator must be defined as valid for the 
particular state under consideration, and the resultant state 
must be one of the valid states for the source. See Table 1 
for examples of how these types of rules function. 
Salient characteristics are simply the important facts 
and relations for a target. There may be certain data which 
weighs more heavily than others with respect to satisfying or 
defining the goal. For example, the operation of the ignition 
system has more importance in the context of the mechanical 
operation of an automobile than the seat belts. This con-
straint again allows the inferencing mechanism to pare down 
the available sources to a few . . promising ones based on 
matching on the more important variables. It also prevents 
wasting precious resources validating sources which match on 
some non-critical values but fail on more revealing ones. 
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Finally, some systems rely on the usage of analogic 
'hints' I which explicitly identify potentially useful 
source(s). An example of this may be found in the metaphor 
'heat is like water', which Gentner used as one of the primary 
examples in her Structure Mapping Theory. 15 These hints may 
be specified by the user in the initial description of the 
problem or may be encoded into the system. This is particu-
larly applicable in metaphor-understanding systems, which have 
the dual goals of finding an applicable source and also 
determining what the similarities between the target and 
source are. There is quite some controversy as to whether 
these hints, by instilling bias into the system, dilute the 
purity bf analogic reasoning. However, methodologies which 
use these 'hints' still must use analogy to determine what 
kinds of similarities may be found between the target and the 
identified source(s), if there are indeed any. 
Once the system has determined the most appropriate 
source candidates, a mapping process is initiated between the 
known facts in the source to those in the target. The mapping 
is carried out in a one-to-one fashion, involving goals, 
constraints, object descriptions, relations, and operators. 
Establishing the scope of information that needs to be mapped 
is important; it may not be optimal or even feasible to 
15Kenneth D. Forbus and Dedre Gentner, "Learning Physical Domains: Toward a Theoretical Framework", Machine Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, Vol. II, edited by Ryszard 
s. Michalski, Jaime G. Carbonell, and Tom M. Mitchell (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kauffman Publishers, Inc., 1986), p. 321. 
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attempt to map every element of data. Due to the possibility 
for incomplete problem specification, there is good reason to 
believe that only a partial initial mapping from the source 
can be performed (otherwise, analogy becomes a deterministic 
process and loses some of it's inductive power). The mapping 
process begins with the identification of SOME similarity 
between source and target, and proceeds to extend it based on 
surface or causal relationships from the initial 1 inkages. 
The mapping may occur at the syntactic level, but . is more 
likely to happen at some semantic level below the surf ace 
(possibly even at some highly-abstract level for interdomain 
analogies). In Gick and Holyoak's experiments, establishing 
the analogy between a doctor's use of rays to destroy a tumor 
and a general's attempt to capture a fortress by using an 
army, the schema of using a force to overcome an obstacle will 
initiate a mapping between rays and an army. Once this 
initial mapping has been done, categories are then formed from 
relations surrounding the ray/army mapping, such as the tumor 
and fortress being types of targets. 16 This extension will 
continue until the threshold for establishing a successful 
model is met, or differences between the two invalidate the 
. 
mapping. 
After the potential mappings have been completed for 
known facts in the target, the incomplete portions of the 
target are filled in via extension of the mapping process from 
16Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, p. 298. 
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- ...._ __ 
the source. Models usually can be characterized by some 
hierarchical structure, and the extension process is carried 
out in a top-down manner as the higher-level specifications 
enforce constraints on lower-level objects and relationships. 
This extension continues until the point where all the 
causally-relevant attributes are mapped and the target 1s 
considered to be successfully mapped or the confidence in the 
applicability of the analogy is broken (which reactivates the 
source retrieval mechanism). Sometimes, the elements that 
fail to be mapped are not considered useful for extending the 
model and do not endanger the analogy. These are classified 
as structure-preserving differences. However, elements that 
participate in the source solution path and which fail to be 
mapped will contribute to the breakdown of the analogy and 
cause the system to continue the search for an alternative 
source. These are known as structure-violating differenc-
es. 17 It may be necessary to construct a rough approximation 
of an analogy in the initial analysis, then refine the model 
by the use of diachronic rules. This process may be repeated 
until some threshold is passed whereby decisions to retain or 
abandon the source are made. This threshold must be deter-
mined uniquely for each domain; there are no absolute guide-
lines for deciding how much effort is justified in pursuit of 
creating an analogy. 
17 b. d I l , p. 299. 
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V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RECENT COMPUTATIONAL 
THEORIES FOR ANALOGY 
The well of theoretical approaches and developed models 
which may be used as references for analysis of analogical 
inferencing is continuing to grow, and it would be impractical 
to attempt in this paper to describe each of them. However, 
certain approaches appear as standard references in published 
works on analogy, and it is reasonable to attempt a critique 
of these. Each approach enjoys support from some elements 
within the AI community, and debates as to the advantages of 
one over another are spirited and vigorous. What will become 
apparent is that there are some common threads of reasoning 
between all of them, and that some differences become matters 
of interpretation by the reader. This section will attempt to 
highlight the significant features of each approach. 
Jaime Carbonell presented a model in the early 1980's 
based on the idea that the bulk of human problem-solving 
occurs in a constrained space that is either well-known or 
only slightly altered from known situations. Creation of 
solutions to new problems involves the calling up, or 'remind-
ing' of past problems and corresponding situations that bear 
a strong resemblance to the current problem. This process 
then retrieves behaviors which were appropriate to solving the 
old problem and then adapting the behavior so that it may be 
successfully applied to the problem at hand. This theory 
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became labelled Transformational Analogy (a representation may 
be found in Figure 3) . 20 
Carbonell proposed the classification of the problem set 
as a 4-tuple consisting of the initial state, the goal state, 
the applicable operators, and the constraints which apply to 
the solution path. 21 Both the target situation and the 
potential sources are composed of separate 4-tuples, and the 
similarity/mapping process consists of matching each of the 
components from the source and target situations in the 
problem space. The system uses a variation of a technique 
known as Means Ends Analysis to solve the problem. Means Ends 
Analysis (MEA), alternatively known as the General Problem 
Solver, was devised by Newell and Simon as a control mechanism 
for creating a solution path toward some goal from an initial 
or some intermediate state by choosing operators that reduce 
the distance to the goal state. 22 Operators which do not 
shorten the span between the current state and the goal are 
not considered, unless they visit nodes which satisfy neces-
sary preconditions for goal satisfaction. One of the central 
issues is to create an evaluation mechanism for determining 
20Jaime G. Carbonell, "Learning by Analogy: Formulating 
and Generalizing Plans from Past Experience", Machine Learn-
ing: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, edited by Ryszard S. 
Michalski, Jaime G. Carbonell, and Tom M. Mitchell (Palo Alto, 
CA: Tioga Publishing Company, 1983), p. 140. 
21 b. d I l , p. 14 2. 
22Patrick Henry Winston, Artificial Intelligence (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1977), p. 131. 
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the appropriate ope_rator to use to reduce the span to the 
goal. Carbonne11 uses a specialized difference metric to 
determine if the transformation is moving toward or away from 
the goal state, based on operator selection. 
Initially, the reminding process uses the target specifi-
cation of the 4-tuple to select an appropriate source which is 
similar to the target. A similarity metric is utilized to 
find the minimal differentiation between: 
1) The initial states of the target and source problems 
.2) The final states of the target and source problems 
3) The path constraints under which both the target and 
source operated in the process of goal satisfaction 
4) The proportion of operator preconditions of the oper-
ator sequence from the source which are applicable 
tq the target problem (also known as the applicabili-
ty of candidacy) 23 
After a candidate source has been selected, the mapping 
process between source and target is carried out by transform-
ing the source solution sequence into one which satisfies the 
criteria attached to the new problem (see Figure 4). The 
initial state is considered to be that of the source problem, 
and the final state is that of the new problem. Thus, the 
system attempts to reduce the differences between the initial 
and final states by using a series of operators to transform 
the problem space (see Table 2). This space (also known as 
23carbonell, "Learning by Analogy", p. 142. 
43 
the T-~pace or analogy transform problem space) may be 
characterized by the following: 
1) A set of states representing solutions to the 
original problem 
2) The initial state of the retrieved problem 
3) The goal state (solution specification) of the new 
problem 
4) An operator which transforms a solution sequence into 
another sequence 
5) A difference metric which is a combination of the 
differences between the components of the 4-tuple 
described earlier (each component must be reduced in 
the problem solving process); see Figure 5 for a 
detailed description 
6) A difference table which indexes the operators as a 
function of their ability to reduce the difference 
7) Removal of path constraints, because the intermediate 
states and operators do not necessarily correspond to 
those in the real world24 
Now that the problem space has been defined, a description of 
the actual problem-solving process is in order. The steps 
are: 
1) Compare the current state to the goal state 
2) Choose an operator to reduce the difference, using 
the difference table 
24 Ibid, pp. 143-146. 
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( 
3) Apply the operator if possible. If not, save the 
current state and form a solution for the subproblem 
4) When a subproblem has been solved, restore the saved 
state and continue to work on the original problem25 
The process is considered as having been successful when the 
difference metric consists of nill difference values for each 
of the components in the 4-tuple. 
This approach was criticized later because it relied 
heavily on the assumption that similarly-specified problems 
would have similarly-specified solution paths, and this 
succeeds only when the problems are identical or nearly so. 
If the specifica.tions happen to vary more than slightly, then 
the process does not perform much better than if random 
guesses at solutions are made. This is because the solution 
paths can vary radically if the problems are not closely 
related. Also, the similarity metric is employed for retriev-
ing the applicable sources, but details are not given as to 
how the metric is specified. 26 
In 1986, Carbonell revised his theory into Derivational 
Analogy. The substantial difference between this approach and 
that of Transformational Analogy is that the solution . lS 
specified as a set of actions that transform the initial state 
into the goal state, rather than a sequence of operators. The 
25 b. d I l , p. 141. 
26stuart J. Russell, The Use of Knowledge in Analogy and 
Induction (London: Pittman, 1989), p. 118. 
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useful similarities are not to be found in application of 
transformations (in the form of declarative assertions) but 
rather a set of decisions and internal-reasoning steps derived 
from the general problem specification. 27 The process may be 
defined as follows (a representation may be found in Figure 
6) : 
1) Two problems share significant aspects if they match 
within a preset threshold in the initial partial. 
matching process 
2) Knowledge is transferred as a sequence of control 
actions 
3) Transfer of knowledge is facilitated by altering the 
retrieved solution according to some transformation 
steps until the requirements of the new problem are 
satisfied (reconsider old decisions in the context 
of the new problem) 
4) Selection of similar problems from the past is 
constrained by a memory-indexing scheme (episodic 
memory) and a partial pattern matcher28 
Two of the significant differences in this model from 
Transformational Analogy are the importance placed on similar-
ity in the initial stages of the problem solution specifica-
tion and the alternative path evaluation/backtracking mecha-
nism. The problem transformation steps are delineated below. 
27 b. d I 1 , p. 118. 
28carbonell, "Derivational Analogy", pp. 375-376. 
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1) At each step of the solution process, store the 
subgoal structure of the problem, alternatives 
that were considered and supporting reasons for the 
chosen path (along with dependencies), references to 
knowledge helpful in making a decision, and the 
solution space itself 
2) If direct plan instantiation cannot be used 
successfully, utilize other weak methods to solve 
the problem 
3) If the reasoning process in the new problem is the 
same as the old problem, retrieve the reasoning 
trace and apply derivational transformations 
4) Apply derivations as follows: 
a) check to see if the reasons for performing a 
step are valid by comparing the dependency 
specifications in the source and target, and 
evaluating external assumptions 
b) if a) is true, continue to the next step 
c) if a) is false, try a different derivation path 
to see if the reasons are still justified 
d) if c) concludes the problem is not justified, 
then either evaluate other alternatives, 
initiate a subgoal to establish support for 
the old decision in the context of the new 
problem, or abandon the derivational approach 
altogether in favor of another solution method 
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5) If th~re is more than one failure path, try to 
determine if the reasons for failure still apply but 
the reasons for selecting the path are still valid 
6) Keep the dependency links if a different decision is 
made at some juncture from what was in the old 
problem 
7) Abandon the derivational analogy model if there are 
too many invalidations 
8) If the entire derivation applies (analogy success-
ful), then store the divergence as a potentially use-
ful source for future problems (and even general plan 
formulation) 29 
As can be seen, similarities may be justified more in the 
analysis of the initial problem-solving steps. However, this 
may be viewed as simply imposing additional constraints on the 
solution space and trivially reducing the analogy problem. As 
Russell points out, once the first few problem-solving steps 
have been matched, the process of determining the rest of the 
solution path cannot become worse than before. Also, as 
identified in the Transformational Analogy model, many 
problems have their similarity confirmed at abstract levels of 
specification and which have no commonality of a solution 
structure. 30 This is particularly true in interdomain analo-
gies, although it can happen within a domain as well. 
29 Ibid , pp . 3 7 9 - 3 8 3 . 
30Russell, p. 119. 
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Finally, the restriction that the solution path is constrained 
by the initial step er steps of the problem may eliminate 
potentially-relevant problem solutions and may also include 
problems which share a common starting point but not much else 
beyond it. 
At the same time that Carbonell was . proposing the 
Transformational Analogy model, Dedre Gentner was unveiling 
her Structure Mapping Theory. Her work is based on extensive 
psychological studies regarding human interpretation of 
metaphors. The central concept regarding analogy is that 
predicate structures can be mapped between domains that have 
different objects and surface appearances. The object 
attributes are mapped to a much lesser degree from source ·to 
target. The relations between objects in the source and those 
in the target are determined by their roles in a relational 
structure. Thus, the analogy is syntactically-based and 
successful mapping is dictated by the quality and extent of 
structural correspondence. 31 
The comparisons are governed by two criteria: accessibil-
ity and usefulness. Accessibility, which is the likelihood 
that a match will be noticed, depends on the familiarity of 
the source and also the overall similarity between the source 
and target descriptions. Usefulness relies on the determina-
tion that the content of the match is appropriate to the new 
31 Ibid, p. 120. 
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problem, and also on the degree to which the content of a 
match can be analyzed. 32 
In addition, there are three characteristics which 
contribute to the quality of an analogy: relationality, 
abstractness, and systematicity. Relationality is the degree 
to which similarities may be viewed as shared relational 
predicate structures rather than shared attributes. 33 
Gentner seems to imply that the relationships between parts of 
the problem contribute to the applicability of the analogy 
much more than the object descriptions themselves, which 
generates controversy by implying that the object attributes 
have little effect on the cause of behavior on the system. 
Abstractness refers to the number of higher-order relations in 
the similarity. Gentner defines multiple orders of relations: 
a first-order relation is between objects; a second-order 
relation is between instances of first-order relations; and n-
order relations are between instances of (n-1) -order rela-
tions. 34 The quality of an analogy is defined by the level 
of abstractness in the relations. Finally, a condition called 
systematicity indicates the constraints between predicates in 
an analogy. 35 The higher-order relations impose constraints 
on lower-order relations, and this may be somehow related to 
32Forbus and Gentner, p. 325. 
33Russell, p. 120. 
34 Ibid , pp . 12 0 -12 1 . 
35 Ibid, p. 121. 
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the default hierarchy principle active in domain knowledge. 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate how Structure Mapping Theory 
defines the structure of water flow and heat flow. 
Gentner and Kenneth Forbus built upon the Structure 
Mapping Theory to compose a system of learning called Qualita-
tive Process Theory. This model is grounded in the notion 
that human domain knowledge begins as a collection of experi-
ences regarding certain phenomena which is developed into a 
complete network of processes which explain how the domain 
functions. Also, perceptually-based representations are 
learned at an earlier stage of life than abstract relation-
ships, so there is a shift . in the ways that humans . view a 
domain as they get older and build a knowledge store. There 
are four different mental models which are invoked: protohist-
ories, causal corpus, naive physics, and expert models. 
Protohistories are rich, specific, highly perceptual represen-
tat ions of observations in the world. The causal corpus 
composes a representation as a causal connection between 
variables. Naive physics represents the beginnings of process 
formation. Finally, expert models are a quantitative (ab-
stract) representation of objects and relations. 36 Besides 
the notion that learning development is a process of going 
from the specific to the abstract, Qualitative Process theory 
states that people build experiential models based on process-
36Forbus and Gentner, pp. 329-340. 
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es from a history of experiences. Evidence of these ideas is 
offered in the shift of knowledge representation as a 
person proceeds from novice to expert in a given domain. 
In 1985, Brian Falkenhainer presented an implementation 
of a system named Phineas, which combined Structure Mapping 
Theory and Qualitative Process Theory into an analogical model 
called Verification Based Analogical Learning (VBAL) . 37 The 
system attempts to retrieve an analogous experience from the 
past in order to describe some observed phenomenom when the 
current domain model fails to provide an adequate explanation. 
The prime example utilized in his explanation of the system 
process relates to discovering models of heat flow and liquid 
flow (see Figure 9 for a computational representation). The 
underlying assumption is that syntactic similarities imply 
relational similarities, which is consistent with Structure 
Mapping Theory. Since domain knowledge is utilized . in 
Phineas, the system does deviate from the pure theory advanced 
by Gentner and Forbus. In addition, goal satisfaction is of 
primary concern with respect to source selection, as opposed 
to strict structural matching. 
The basic criticism of Gentner' s 1pproach seems to be 
that the basis for analogy . remains syntactically-oriented 
instead of semantically-oriented. It disregards the possibil-
37Brian Falkenhainer, "Scientific Theory Formulation 
through Analogical Inference", Proceedings of the Fourth 
International Workshop on Machine Learning (Irving, CA: Morgan 
Kauffman Publishers, Inc., 1987), p. 218. 
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ity that the same analogy may have different mappings for 
different goals. Also, the basis for analogical transfer is 
not made clear, since the process is not goal-driven. The 
search process for an appropriate source is not adequately 
explained. The examples given in the literature are meta-
phors, so the source has been preselected. This point alone 
may raise suspicions as to the capability of SMT to function 
as an analogical reasoner in the same manner as some of the 
other systems being reviewed. Threshold determination for 
making determinations of the goodness of the analogy are not 
detailed; it is unclear how the decision to accept a metaphor 
as valid, or how the scope of the analogy is detected, are 
made explicit. Finally, the ignorance of domain knowledge for 
the process is a serious flaw, unless it is intended that the 
higher-order relations represent some form of domain knowl-
edge. This is not made clear in her explanations. 
Russell Greiner implemented a model of an analogy system 
called NLAG, which intends to infer facts from a source domain 
to an unfamiliar target domain by way of analogy. The use
r 
makes general analogical statements which are presented in the 
form "A is like B", so it is apparent that analogic 'hints' 
are used to define the source and the issue is to determine 
the proper mapping to the target. The prime example used in 
the literature explaining the operation of NLAG involves an 
analogy between a hydraulics circuits problem and the DC 
circuit domain. He compares the flow rate of liquids to
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electric current and uses the analogy to map across Ohm's law 
and Kirchhoff's laws into the target domain. 38 
Greiner emphasizes two refinements to the constraining of 
possibl~ analogical inferences: useful analogical inference 
and abstraction-based analogical inference. First, useful 
analogical inference is described as utilization of the goal 
state to reduce the search space. This means that inferences 
will only be considered to be valid analogies if their 
structures contribute to achieving the goal state (causal 
relations). The second refinement, abstraction-based infer-
ence, refers to clusters of facts which are related to each 
other in a given domain. 39 Relations become abstractions 
when they have representation in multiple domains. These 
clusters of facts can be used collectively to solve some 
problem in the target domain because they concentrate the 
inference process on the set of goal-relevant properties. The 
abstraction concept is strengthened by the fact that plans are 
reusable in multiple domains and have been used successfully 
(although this is not supported via concrete examples in the 
literature). Abstractions assist the inferencing in another 
38Russell Greiner, "Learning by Understanding Analogies", 
Machine Learning: A Guide to Current Research, edited by Torn 
M. Mitchell, Jaime G. Carbonell, and Ryszard S. Michalski (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), pp. 81-82. 
39Ibid, pp. 81-82. 
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way by making explicit the variant and invariant bodies of 
facts and relations. 40 
He noted that there still may be a potentially-large body 
of abstractions, even given the analogies and a knowledge base 
with domain-specific information (facts and abstractions). An 
additional capability to reduce the number of analogies is 
administered via two special heuristics: one specifies that 
the search should be constrained to relevant (goal-serving) 
abstractions, and the other is the notion that better analo-
gies impose fewer constraints on the environment (weakness 
er i ter ia) . 41 
In 1986, John Holland, Keith Holyoak, Richard Nisbett, 
and Paul Thagard published a comprehensive work on induction. 
This group combined the knowledge of computer . science, 
psychology, and philosophy in a unique environment, in order 
to define an integrated approach for applying human inductive 
behaviors to a computational model. Holyoak had prior 
background in analogical studies, and is especially known for 
his experiments with M. L. Gick in the early 1980s in analogy 
using the military/radiation example (see Figure 10). From 
these beginnings, Holyoak and his colleagues have created a 
theory based on the notion of mental models. Mental models 
are representations of situations, and may be composed of one 
or more existing schemas. They may be modified as information 
40 Ibid, p. 83. 
41 Ibid, p. 83. 
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is added or changed, and allows categories or roles to be 
created or defined; they are descriptions of some part of a 
domain. Mental models are built for the source and target 
situations, and some transition function(s) relate the 
elements from one to the other. If there is a transition 
function such that a one-to-one mapping may be determined, it 
is labelled a homomorphism. However, if there must be 
multiple transition functions to define the mapping correctly, 
~ rn, ~ c: i -mnrnh i c:m 
\..A. '-j_ \,,.A.'-4,...._, ...L. All..._...&... t-'.a..a. ...a... ..-.1.11 f or q-morphism. n-mnrnhic:ms X All"'-'.&...l:"'.&..&.,..L-.4L 
generally act on some higher or more abstract level in the 
model than on the level of specific object attributes, and 
form general categories in some sort of a default hierarchy. 
Associated with this idea are other substantial issues as the 
process of identifying significant similarities among poten-
tial sources, the decisions as to what properties from the 
source are to be mapped to the target (from the potentially 
overwhelming possibilities), and the complex problem of 
handling interdomain analogical searches. Their integrated 
approach resulted in the development of the PI model (Process 
of Induction) . 
Their characterization of the algorithm for determining 
an analogy is described below: 
1) First, a mental representation is composed for 
both the source and the target (source has not yet 
been chosen) 
2) Selection of a potentially relevant source 
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3) Mapping of known facts between source and target 
(according to the roles those facts play) 
4) Extension of the mapping to generate rules which are 
then applied to the target to form a successful 
solution42 
These steps may be processed iteratively due to the hierarchi-
cal construction of the problem space, and may also be 
processed in any necessary order (this is, steps 1-4 need not 
be carried out serially). 
Similar to Carbonell's process, encoding the target is 
defined by the initial state, goal state, applicable opera-
tors, and path constraints. Functionally-complete specifica-
tions are critical to optimizing the source selection process, 
but it is recognized that analogical . . processing 1s often 
invoked when attempts to solve the problem by other more 
direct means have failed (implying incomplete or conflicting 
data). 
The retrieval of an appropriate source is defined as a 
two-phase process. First, the target problem is transformed 
by activating synchronic rules that are related to components 
of the target, which in turn activate other concept rules. 
The intention is to spread the transformation wide enough to 
ensure the best possible opportunity to select a good source. 
A good source is defined as one in which many interrelated 
properties are matched to the target. The emphasis is to 
42Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, p. 292. 
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r~trieve. sources which match on properties that are goal-
relat~d instead of those which are surface-related (syntac-
tic) . A pr:omising source analog is found when synchronic 
rules relate the source initial state to the target initial 
state, diachronic rules connect the source initial state to 
the source goal state, and synchronic rules can be found that 
relate the source goal state to the target goal state. 43 In 
addition, diachronic rules from the source are connected to 
concepts that associate with the initial and goal states of 
the target, thus masking out rules which are not related to 
goal satisfaction. This becomes the 'second order modeling', 
whereby the model of the target is constructed after the 
source model in an isomorphic or q-morphic manner (see Figure 
11). As the network of connections spreads and connects the 
source to the goal, the mapping process develops in parallel. 
Once the source has been established, the groundwork has been 
laid to extend the mapping. 
One of the end products of the mapping process 
. 
lS the 
development of an abstract schema that bridges the source and 
target problems. This schema identifies elements that were 
related to the goal satisfaction for both source and target, 
and also were mapped correctly between the two. In addition, 
the schema allows the similarities to be retained and the 
differences to be deleted. This schema takes the form of a 
system of rules, both synchronic and diachronic. In the case 
43 b. d I l , p. 311. 
58 
of interdomain analogies, where the surface similarities are 
relatively few, the abstract schema which defines the semantic 
view of the relations becomes particularly important. This is 
not to say that surface similarities are not of value, just 
that they become less important as the structural composition 
of the source and target grows further apart. 
observation of the generation of abstract schemas 
One last 
. is that 
proto-categories which can be used to generalize across 
individual examples will evolve as each new problem is 
analyzed. These proto-categories, which are used as default 
hierarchies in the mapping process (mapping occurs top-down, 
goals existing at the top), will have variations and special 
cases to account for the diversity of problem situations 
presented to it. However, they then become the generalized 
patterns which are utilized by the process that reminds the 
system of similar situations. The abstract schema can be used 
to solve problems by means of prestored general rules as the 
preferred approach, with building a model by analogy as a 
fallback mechanism. 
. 
. Where some systems attempted to mix metaphor processing 
with similarity processing, Stuart Russell defined analogy to 
be a process whereby known similarities between two objects 
can be used to infer the probable existence of further 
similarities. He felt that metaphors did not belong in the 
same class as analogy, although he recognized that there was 
confusion regarding the issue because the goal for both was 
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the same (find some commonality between the source and 
target). 44 He stated that constraints must be found for the 
matching between the source and target because the potential 
number of similarities could be enormous. Also, he believed 
the intent for finding an analogy is to extend the knowledge 
in the target beyond that which is known, rather than simply 
determine that the analogy does or does not hold. 
In order to know if an analogy is true, the system must 
know if the similarity is relevant to the goal, and a mecha-
nism known as determinations can be utilized for that purpose. 
Relevance is defined as the degree to which a predicate is 
affected by an attribute, or two facts are affected by each 
other. Total determination is when all facts relevant to goal 
satisfaction are known (that . 1s, the similarity has been 
established) . Partial determination is when there 1s some-
thing less than complete relevance. Determinations are used 
to represent facts which capture similarities in the· world and 
allow synchronic/diachronic transformation of source problems 
to match the current problem situation. 45 
Previous attempts to define source selection have 
included the use of analogic 'hints' I whereby the user has 
preselected the potential source, and a similarity-counting 
technique which determines the best source as being the one 
with the greatest number of similarities to the target. The 
44Russel 1, p. 18. 
45 b. d I 1 , pp. 26-28. 
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primary problem with both of these approaches is that they 
contain built-in bias. The notion of determinations is rooted 
in causal relations, where certain aspects of outcomes are 
dependent on certain aspects of the preconditions. Based on 
this pattern, the outcomes for the target can be predicted 
from previous situations which have the same preconditions 
(context). Eventually, when a full construction of all the 
factors which affect the outcome of an event are determined 
~nd the outcomes are known, other strong strategies such as 
rule-based reasoning may be used in place of analogy. 
However, it is often the rule that the knowledge 
. . is 1ncom-
plete, so determinations generally operate as weak solutions 
(more variability but faster knowledge acquisition). 
Deciding which facts to use in the search process is an 
outgrowth of the problem of determining which facts properly 
compose the target. The search is made more difficult because 
the source is not predefined and the commonality is unspeci-
fied. Therefore, the first task is to figure out the determi-
nations which are related to the facts that are to be in-
ferred. The basic theorem for data based analogic reasoning 
can be stated as follows: 
((P (x,y) > Q (x,z)) A P(S,A) A P{T,A) A Q(S,B) => Q(T,B) 
The translation of this statement is that: P determines Q if 
there is a known fact Pin the source S that matches a fact P 
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in the target T and a relation that infers a fact Qin the 
target from a known fact Qin the source. 46 
Russell's general process of inferencing involves following 
the next four steps in a nondetermi.nistic order: 
1) Find P such that P (X,y) > Q (x,z) and Qt (z) unifies 
With Q ( X, Z) 
2) Find Pandy such that P (T,y) 
3) Find P,s,y such that P (s,y) and Snot equal to T 
4) Find s,z such that Q (s,z) 47 
Each step along the way cons ta ins the search further. A 
concrete example of the execution of these steps involves 
finding out how much weight Bert gained today. The first step 
relates to finding some relation for which the right-hand side 
unifies with the goal statement. The second step involves 
finding out how much Bert ate today, how much he exercised, 
and what his metabolic rate was. The third step is to find 
some other person who ate the same food, exercised the same 
amount, and possesses the same metabolic rate as Bert. 
Finally, determine how much weight Bert gained by determining 
how much weight the other person gained. 48 Once the target 
facts are found and a potential source is found, constraints 
are imposed on the search for determinations. 
46Ibid , p. 29. 
47Ibid , p. 40. 
48Ibid I p. 40. 
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Due to the variability of specification between the 
source and the target, reformulation (similar to diachronic 
relations) may be used to transform the source and/or target. 
The basis for performing the transformation is not on the 
stored representation, but rather that the semantic ( implicit) 
properties are common. Either set of facts may be reformulat-
ed. Unfortunately, there may be a lengthy process to find 
commonality in the sets of facts. Determinations help to 
constrain the process because the commonality to be inferred 
is known, so the reformulation is directed to a specific end. 
The abstract goal is to construct a top-level reasoning 
mechanism which takes the query as the input and builds an 
appropriate chain of subqueries based on the determinations.-
49 These subqueries are then passed to a theorem-proving 
system to find a solution. If a solution cannot be deduced 
directly from a situation, then the system must decide what 
aspects are relevant to the goal. Those aspects are extract-
ed, a situation matching on the particular aspects is select-
ed, and the goal is solved for that situation. Thus, the 
process of solution may decompose into a series of recursive 
routines which find determinations for subgoals and produce 
solutions, eventually passing back up to the main level for 
the final solution. 
As the last of the theories examined in this section, 
Patrick Winston proposed a similarity-matching scheme that 
49 b. d I 1 , p. 44. 
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attempted to find analogies between Shakespearean plays. 
First, he identified qualities to be found in good model 
representations which would aid the analogical process: 
important facts are explicitly stated; irrelevant facts are 
suppressed; constraints are exposed; the representation can be 
computed from natural inputs; and the descriptions are clear 
and unambiguous. 50 He also believed that analogies must be 
measured by determining what are the important relations in-
the model situations. Questions regarding constraints are to 
be answered by . . examining causal specifications. Also, 
similarities may be directed in the source search process by 
finding matching attributes, relations, or constraints at the 
same level of classifications between situations. Other facts 
may be arbitrarily specified as important by the programmer at 
the beginning of the process. 
The system attempts to find an analogy by finding 
situations in which the objects occupy the same classes as the 
target. Information about classes may be specified in terms 
of A-KIND-OF or HAS-PROPERTY relations, or state relations. 51 
However, the similarity metric which identifies how this is 
defined is not clearly defined. Also, the manner in which 
salience is given to certain facts is not specified. 
50Patrick Henry Winston, "Learning and Reasoning by 
Analogy", Communications of the ACM (Vol. 23, No. 12 December 
1980), p. 690. 
51 Ibid, p. 691. 
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Analogy is centered around the idea that similarity in 
some aspects must determine similarity in other respects. The 
system attempts to match up corresponding parts of the source 
and target-. He did recognize that the mapping would be 
somewhat less than isomorphic, because it would be rare for 
two situations to share the identical sets of properties. In 
the source selection process, he utilized the complete source 
space search in order to score each possible candidate, with 
the source possessing the highest number of matches as the 
best analogy to be considered. Matching was performed at 
varying levels of abstraction or specificity, with transforma-
tion of the facts accomplished through some unspecified means. 
In order to determine the scope of information that . lS 
important for a particular situation, the user may be asked to 
supply some explicit criteria to assist the process. 
In conclusion, many of the important components of 
analogic reasoning are either left unspecified in the litera-
ture, or are made explicit by the user. still, the use of 
causal relations and the use of salient attributes and 
relations to constrain the matching process are important 
ideas. He also implied that learning could be effected by 
creating generalized descriptions from the common characteris-
tics of the source and target parts, subject to applicable 
constraints. 
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52carbonell, "Derivational Analogy", p. 376. 
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(Path Con I) 
(Path Con2) 
Original Space 
( Retrieved Solution) 
T- Space 
Figure 4 - Source Analogy Solution Path Inserted in the 
Analogy T-Space (Transformation Space) 53 
53carbonel 1, "Learning by Analogy", p. 14 3. 
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Operators 
General Insertion 
General deletion 
Subsequence splicing 
Subgoal-preserving 
substitution 
Final-segment con-
catenation 
Initial-segment con-
catenation 
Sequence meshing 
Operator reordering 
Parameter substitution 
Solution-sequence 
truncation 
Sequence inversion 
Description 
Insert a new operator into the solution sequence. 
Delete an operator from the 
solution sequence. Splice a solution to a new 
subproblem into the larger 
established solution sequence. Substitute an operator in the 
original solution sequence by 
another operator (or sequence of operators) that reduces the same difference. 
Treat the solution sequence as a macro-operator in the original problem space and apply MEA to reduce the difference between the old final state and the new final state. 
Apply the process above to find a path in the original problem space from the new initial state to the old initial state. Merge the operator sequences of two complementary solutions re-trieved in the reminding pro-
cess. 
Reorder the operators in a 
solution sequence. Substitute the objects to which operators were applied in the retrieved solution by the cor-
responding objects in the new problem specification. Eliminate unnecessary operators. 
Reverse the operator sequence, inverting each individual opera-tor. 
Table 2 - T-Operators Used in Carbonell's Transforma-tional Analogy54 
54 Ibid, pp. 144-145. 
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Dr < DO ( S l. I , SJ. 2 } , Do( SF. I , SF. 2) ·' 
Dp(PC 1.PC2), DA.(S0L 1.SOL2)> 
~, D0 is the difference function between states in the original space. 
CJ Dp computes differ~nces between path constraints cPC's). 
r_; DA measure"S the applicability ·of the old solution in the ne\\' scenario by determining the fraction of operators in the initial solution "c-quence ( SOL 1) whose preconditions are not satisfied under the ne\\ problem specification. 
c, S1 denotes an initial state. 
o SF -denotes a final (goal) state . 
. C) The subscript- 1 indexes the retrieved solution. 
o The subscript 2 indexes the specifications on the desired solution to the new problem. 
Figure 5 - D"escription of Difference Metric55 
55 b. d I 1 , p. 14 6. 
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56carbonell, "Derivational Analogy", p. 377. 
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Figure 7 - Representation of Water Situation in Gentner•·s Structure Mapping Theory57 
57Forbus and Gentn·er, .P. 3 22 .. 
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Water Flow History 
(Decreasing (Pressure (At ca-beaker SO))) 
(Increasing (Pressure (At ca-vial SO))) 
(Decreasing (Amount-of (At ca-beaker SO))) 
(Increasing (Amount-of (At ca-vial SO))) 
(~leeta SO Sl) 
(Constant (Pressure (At cs-beaker Sl))) 
(Constant (Preaaure (At ca-vial S1))) 
(Const.ant (Amount-of (At ca-beaker Sl))) 
\ (Constant (Amount-of (At ca-vial S1))) 
(Equal-To (Pre11ure (At ca-beaker Sl)) 
(Pre11ure (At ca-vial 51))~ 
(Function-Of (Pre1aure ?x) 
(Amount-of ?x)) 
Heat Flow History 
(Decreasing (Temperature (At horse-shoe SO))) 
(Increasing (Temperatur, (At 11ater SO))) 
(t.:eets SO S 1) 
(Constant ( Temper:\ture (At horse-shoe S1))) 
(Constant ( T emper~ture (At ·11ater S1))) 
(Equal-To ( T emper:it ure (At horse-shoe S1)) 
( Temper:\ture (At ·11 a t e r S 1 ) ) ) 
(Function-Of (Temperature ?x) 
(Heat ?x)) 
Match 
Pressure 
-
Temperature 
Amount -of 
-
Heat 
so 
-
so 
Sl 
-
S1 
ca-beaker 
-
horse-shoe 
ca-vial 
-
.·:a ter 
Figure 9 - Analogical Match Between Water Flow 
and Heat Flow Using Falkenhainer' s VBAL59 
59Falkenhainer, p. 2 2 6. 
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~i..litary Prob!~Wi 
I nit i-al -;t a.tt' 
Goal: 
R t'SOllfet'S: 
()prrators: 
t ·.·w arnn !() < ,1pttff(' li,nn·-;_...,_ 
Sufficit>ntlv lari{c ,trrn,·. 
I li \ · i cfr a rm y. rn n n· a r rn v. , 1 t tack w i t h a rrn v. 
Constr;iints: l 'w1hlt· t · ·nd t. I ,J 1· I 
. < . . (J ",t ('fl If(' :ifn1\ ,i On~ <)flt' roau Sat'\'. 
Solution plan: St·nd snLtll i{rt>ups ,doni{ multiple roads 
-;i 111 ult ,tflt'<>usl , .. 
()utcornr: FortrC.'iS ( ,tpturt'd f)\ ,trfll\'. 
Radiation problem 
Initial state 
( ;oal: 
Resourcrs: 
()prra tors: 
Constrain ts: 
L'-;c rays to rlcstroy tumor. 
Sufficiently pd\\·t'rful rays. 
Red ucr ray in trnsi t v. movt' ray source, admini·s ter 
ravs. 
L. nahle t<.> .1d-rninister high-intensity rays from u.n.e 
directic>n safrlv. 
Solution plan: .-\d minister low-in trnsit v ravs from 'multi pie di rec-
t ions sim ul taneousl v. 
. . 
()ucrome: Tumor drstroved bv ravs. 
Convergence schema 
Initial state 
Goal: 
Resources: 
()pera tors: 
( :unstrain ts: 
Solution plan:· 
()qt.come:· 
Use force to overcome a cen t_ral target. 
Sufficien ti y great force. 
Reduce force intensity, mo,·r source of force, apply 
force .. 
Unable to apply full force along one path safely. 
Apply weak forces along multiple paths 
simultaneouslv. 
. . 
Central target overcome by force. 
Figure 10 ~ Convergence Schema from Gick and Holyoak 
1983 Study60 
60Holland et al, p. 293. 
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World A 
----ir . s 
~I,' 
World B 
Sa,_, 
P.,, 
Pa Pa · 
Source 
S'A I T~ s;_ (. 1 ... 
Target ;/ ;/ 
Sar Ta Ss,., 
Figure 11 - Analogy as Morphism Between Two Mental 
Models01 
61 b. d I 1, p. 297. 
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VI. CRITICAL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN ANALOGY 
Any developing f'ield will be ripe for criticism from 
observers who will be quick to point out the shortcomings ~nd 
failed expectations. Many times, it . lS a sign that the 
interested parties are simply impatient with the slow progress 
that accompanies research. Certainly, the concept of machine 
learning is not entirely novel; it has been bandied about for 
many years. However, there is a growing sophistication to the 
theories and models, and issues which were previous.ly ad-
dressed primarily as academic debate are now being attacked as 
important issues by researchers intent on creating workable 
implementations. Of course, each level of comprehension 
gained and each barrier crossed brings with it an attendant. 
host of new problems and issues to be solved. It is in this 
spi~it that a number -of important ·areas in analogic reasoning 
be hi~hlighted, in order to focus attention on problems which 
prevent analogy from becoming part of the standard toolkit ih 
induction and expert systems developmeht. 
First and foremost, there is no single strong model for 
the mechanism by which humans use analogy. The philosophic 
and psychologic literature can provide much of the symptomatic 
description of analogy and speculate as to how it functions. 
To date, however, there has been no consensus to a homogeneous 
model for human analogy, and even less to a rugged, support-
ive, computational representation of it. The evolution of 
machine learning systems and ideas incorporating analogy as a 
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component has brought many new and differing ideas to the 
world of cognitive thought. Whenever the systems are taken 
outside of rather tightly constrained boundaries, though, they 
fail rather spectacularly. Since humans appear to sidestep 
this problem with relative ease, it points clearly to the 
imperfection of understanding the nature of the human capacity 
these systems are supposed to model. This does not mean that 
research. should halt until some miracle occurs and the heads 
of cognitive researchers everywhere are filled with enlighten-
ment. Rather, it means that newer or more refined systems 
will continue to fail along the evolutionary path, although 
with decreasing probability or over a wider range of domain 
knowledge than before, as possible paths are explored and then 
retained or discarded. At some point, theoretical refinement 
will achieve a point of diminishing returns and implementa-
tions will be constructed which are robust enough to fulfill 
some roles in production systems. However, research in both 
the psychologic and computational cognition fields needs to 
continue until a complete picture is formulated, and systems 
can then use that knowledge to create reliahle general-purpose 
reasoning tools. 
Secondly, the role of domain knowledge in these systems 
needs to be clarified. Most systems that were mentioned in 
this paper utilized domain knowledge to some extent, whether 
it was explicitly stated in rules, implied in relationships 
between elements, or defined as metaknowledge which guided the 
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entire deci~ion-making process. The central issue of domain 
knowledge is to conclude whether information . is c·ontext-
sensitive, and how the same explicit pieces of data may be 
interpreted many different ways depending on the perspective 
and intent of the reasoner. The arrangement of dependencies 
and relationships of individual . pieces of information . in 
layers of a default hierarchy, which operates in an abstract 
fashion at the top level and becomes more specific with each 
successive layer, is an interesting concept which needs 
further exploration. For interdomain analogies, it becomes 
important to use the abstract formulations in source selec-
tion, because surface structures tend to be very dissimilar. 
The surface similarity tends to be most applicable in situa-
tions which coexist within the same subdomain. Even within a 
domain, though, many surface differences may be present and 
the solution paths may not resemble each other, but domain 
knowledge can help to enforce similarity at higher levels of 
abstraction. Therefore, the role of domain knowledge is two-
fold: to help constrain the search process by defining the 
limits of what an appropriate source could look like at any 
level, and also to help with the mapping process. With 
regards to the second point, the domain knowledge defines data 
relationships and facilitates definition of the corresponding 
components of the target and source. Finally, since domain 
knowledge may be able to construct the framework of both the 
target and source, the mapping process can then be extended to 
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fill in the missing pieces in the target more easily from the 
source. 
Additional work needs to be done in machine learning, 
however, to create some generic standards as to how domain 
knowledge can be created, as well as rules for creating and 
maintaining relationships and data structures. Of course, 
provision for exceptional situations would have to be taken 
into account, but it is likely that quite a bit of data could 
be expressed in a modularized and standardized fashion. If 
this could be done, applications CQUld more easily communicate 
with each other and provide interdomain transfer. There 
exists a current problem in that individual research efforts 
are directed toward a specific domain that is known, and the 
logic and representation are somewhat biased by the structures 
already in place for that area of knowledge. This proposal 
does not intend to discard existing structures that have been 
defined, but to declare other abstract superlayers over this 
data which can provide the necessary descriptions and connec-
tions that meld with other domains and, ultimately, a stan-
dardized analogic reasoner. 
Source selection tends to be regarded as the most 
difficult of the steps in analogical reasoning. Many times, 
the actual details of the search process are not provided in 
the literature, or the environment is tightly constrained so 
that the search process either becomes unambiguous or the 
source has been preselected (leading the witness, to borrow a 
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legal expression). Domain knowledge, as stated before, may 
help constrain the search process by eliminating time spent 
analyzing data which may appear structurally similar but does 
not possess the same goal satisfaction criteria. It can also 
pare down the interdomain search to those few plausible. 
sources that match on abstract model specifications. The 
reljance on this mechanism will become more important because 
the search space grows as knowledge bases grow. The human 
brain, unlike computers, may not always retain stored informa-
tion forever (some are more fortunate in this respect than 
others), so the search space can become naturally constrained. 
Models have been proposed to have computers 'forget' informa-
tion if it has not been accessed within a specified period of 
time, and to remember first what it is most familiar (or most 
recent occurrence). However, this is certainly not a palat-
able solution because large bodies of knowledge might be 
discarded which are valuable in the right context. 
The purpose of having domain knowledge available is to 
create a framework of information from the user request such 
that a similar framework can be identified from the knowledge 
base. The composition of frameworks which are transportable 
and matchable helps avoid the need for defining relationships 
at the data element level, except for exceptional situations. 
These exceptions must have auxiliary relationships which are 
activated under certain conditions. Of course, the downside 
of proliferation of this knowledge means that frames must be 
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predefined for each domain. Accuracy and comprehensiveness 
of the analogical search, of course, will depend on the 
richness with which each frame . populated. lS Search strate-
. 
must be able to work with partial matching, g1es but the 
of the frame that . accessed will affect the sparseness lS 
quality of the match and also the . As less mapping process. 
information becomes available to the reasoner, the uncertainty 
factor grows inversely proportional. 
The other major issue with searching becomes the decision 
to accept a source as an analogy or not. Once again, as 
domain knowledge grows, it can enforce define similarities on 
the basis of physical appearance, goal satisfaction, data 
dependencies, and/or data values. However, the amount of 
similarity that is required in order for the system to declare 
success in source retrieval 1s ambiguous. Certainly, defining 
confidence levels based on the number of similarities that are 
goal-related is a possible consideration. Defining thresholds 
where a complete match must be found at a certain level of 
abstraction, but where higher tolerance levels are allowed for 
more specific representations, is also a possibility. It is 
intuitively obvious that the more data values that match and 
the closer the target resembles the source, the higher the 
confidence that the analogy is sound. Unfortunately, the 
matching becomes more difficult as the source is further 
removed from the domain of the target. Possibly, enforcing 
different sets of restrictions based on the domain relation-
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ship of the source to the target could alleviate some of the 
difficulty with interdomain searches. The problem that must 
be addressed first before any of these mechanisms is activated 
is that of defining a similarity. 
It appears that the published literature defines similar-
ity as exact matches. The comprehension net for any individu-
al piece of information may include synchronic relations which 
redefine it into other representations on which exact matches 
may be found. However, it is possible that the meaning of 
some data is unclear or multi-valued. Therefore, it might be 
advantageous to declare fuzzy sets of data which can be 
defuzzified as domain knowledge expands. Whether by fuzzy 
data sets, tolerance levels for closeness, or some other 
mechanism, the search decision process must determine the 
boundaries of what constitutes a match for similarity. The 
specific frame which defines goal relationships, data sa-
lience, and other analogic criteria might possibly redefine 
the concept of similarity for individual components which are 
accessed during the search. In human analogy, the process of 
recalling similar situations is a product of experience, and 
no two people's experiences are completely alike. Therefore, 
even in human terms some bias with respect to determining 
similarity occurs. However, since a computer will have access 
to a broad range of knowledge without benefit of selective or 
subjective interpretations of that data, some means of 
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providing an objective (or at least a uniform) analysis must 
be found. 
The next issue to be evaluated is that of search con-
straints. In most of the systems, the experimental models are 
bounded in some form which limits the time and resources that 
are committed to finding a source analogue. Sometimes, it is 
the rule base which delimits the search, sometimes the 
knowledge base itself, and sometimes artificial constraints 
like time parameters. The human equivalent of similarity 
recall is not identified very well. It can be hypothesized 
that the sum of the search will be bounded by total experi-
ence, and possibly that the most recent experiences may be 
accessed first for comparison purposes. However, the trigger-
ing of childhood memories by some event in adulthood occurs 
much faster than possibly imagined from some chronogically-
ordered indexing scheme. As knowledge bases expand and 
domains are connected to the 1 ist of available reference 
points for an analogic search, the problem will likely worsen 
dramatically. An associated problem is that growth of 
knowledge also brings an attendant growth of possible analo-
. g1es. There will also likely be some limitations as to 
resources which can tolerably be consumed for the purposes of 
searching for an analogy before some other mechanism 
. 
lS 
employed to solve the problem (at least in a production 
environment). 
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It will be .important to construct some type of indexing 
scheme which may be accessed first before examining each 
possible case in detail. There may even be more than one 
index, based on each salient aspect of an abstract analogic 
categorization. These indexes could be cached in computer 
memory and some type of concatenated intersectional search 
could be performed based on values for each of the categories. 
If there was no successful full or partial match at the 
intersectional index level, then the system could either 
declare failure by analogy and proceed to another problem-
solving methodology, or redefine the target problem (or parts 
of it) and retry the match against the indexes. This seems to 
be putting the cart before the horse, though. The priority is 
to determine how to define the indexing process. 
It seems that there may be levels of abstraction in the 
index which correspond to the abstraction levels in domain 
knowledge. In each of these abstractions, a select group of 
attributes may be used for the index. The matching process 
would be performed in stages, whereby matching occurs first on 
the most abstract indexes and constrains the domains, then 
proceeds to the next less-abstract index level to constrain 
the subdomains, and so on. This could be done on a one-level 
concatenation of all abstraction levels, which would create a 
rather large search space. Whether by these or by some other 
means, searching on some subset of information before proceed-
ing to an exhaustive depth-first search of each domain. 
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Following this process, the best candidates could be ordered 
in some fashion by th~ deepest level to which the match was at 
least partially successful and also by the number of matches 
found. 
One last i tern to be considered in search constraints 
revolves around the idea of whether analogy is confined to 
sources where existing similarities are already found, or to 
metaphors where the source has been specified but no similar 
characteristics have yet been identified. Analogy for the 
purposes of this paper is characterized as extending the 
mapping from some source, specified or unspecified, to a 
target. The similarities may be known or unknown at the time 
the target . lS identified. The purpose of the analogic 
reasoner is to determine 1) whether there is an appropriate 
source in the knowledge base and 2) that there are mappings 
which can be made from source to target. If the user has 
identified a potential source as a metaphor, he has indeed 
constrained the search. However, this does not mean that the 
search is over, because it is possible that there really is no 
similarity between the two situations; it is a function of the 
goal and its dependencies. Therefore, in a metaphor-under-
standing situation, the system may declare failure if it 
cannot identify some mapping successfully, or it may proceed 
to carry out extension mapping based on finding some initial 
similarities. In this sense, metaphors can constrain the 
search. It is important for the user to define to some degree 
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the nature of the search process. If he has already identi-
fied potential sources and wants to evaluate their analogic 
potential, the system should respond in like manner. If he 
wishes to find any appropriate analogy in the vastness of the 
knowledge base, that should likewise be indicated. The search 
is just as much a function of user goals as the mapping 
process itself. 
The issue of repair strategies for incomplete analogies 
has not been addressed in published literature in a comprehen-
sive manner, and this paper unfortunately cannot provide much 
more insight. One of the prime strengths of analogy is that 
it . lS well-suited for ill-defined or incomplete problem 
specifications. This leads one to believe that there will 
also be analogies that are found which are less than perfect, 
which may mean the initial similarities between source and 
target are not isomorphic. Partial mappings due to missing 
specifications, even after source selection, can lead to 
incomplete analogies. The task of the repair strategy is to 
find some way of patching the mapping between the source and 
target so that the remaining slots which are interrelated to 
the target goal can be filled. It may also mean that there 
may are goal-related attributes and relationships in the 
source for which there is no corresponding mapping in the 
target. Possibly, these anomalies may have to be corrected by 
external modification of the specifications or domain knowl-
edge. Alternatively, the system could create subgoals for the 
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missing components, which would entail reactivating the 
search. The system could also hunt for another analogy better 
suited to the model, or abandon analogy altogether for another 
methodology. A better understanding of the human mechanism 
for resolving these kinds of problems would be helpful. 
If it is possible to provide enough domain knowledge so 
that the system may understand why the data that is sought is 
not available, or why it is important (how does it contribute 
to goal satisfaction; is it part of the commonality of the 
domain), then the system may create subgoals which may be used 
to find partial analogies to fill in the missing pieces. 
These subgoals would then have to be integrated into the whole 
solution, which means that merging mechanisms would have to be 
created to resolve differences. At the very least, if these 
types of mechanisms are not available, the system should be 
able to provide analysis of the promising sources and some 
explanation of what parts of the analogy need to be repaired 
and why. 
In the course of determining a proper source for a 
target, an abstract definition for the problem may be con-
structed which is used as the model against which potential 
sources are matched. The source problem also may have an 
abstract specification. When a source has been selected for 
mapping, there will be a convergence of the two abstract 
models - an intersection of the common features of both. This 
represents a proto-category which groups analogues that have 
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commonality with each other, and is called a schema. In the 
course of schema induction, the objects and relationships 
which contribute to goal satisfaction and also map successful-
ly to the target are identified. Generalizations are formed 
from these elements, which are represented by clusters of 
synchronic and diachronic rules in the schema. The schema 
makes interdomain analogies . easier to process bec-ause the 
abstraction tends to focus on similarities in the generaliza-
tion and isolates differences in packets of rules that are 
invoked in specific instances. Each schema is a product of 
the domain knowledge and problem situations to which it . lS 
exposed, and evolves as the system calls up the schema in 
response to some reminding process for a particular new 
problem. The convergence schema may eventually become a 
product of the variations that proceed from the sum instances, 
therefore creating multiple default hierarchies in the domain . 
This schema may ultimately be utilized first as a . semi-
deterministic mechanism for solving new problems (the assump-
tion being that the new problem does not differ significantly 
from the existing internal structure) . If this approach 
would not succeed, the system would revert back to an analogic 
search to retrieve an appropriate source which matched the 
unique properties of the new problem. 
Finally, there is the problem which has haunted all 
inductive methodologies, including analogy, and that . lS 
justification of the derived solutions. With deductive logic, 
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the solutions are determined from declarative statements which 
can be verified; the facts support the conclusion. That is 
part of the reason that current expert systems design has been 
received so favorably. The knowledge engineer has already 
encoded the reasoning of the expert into IF-THEN-type rule$ 
which trigger based on satisfaction of some preconditions. 
The logic is based on a closed set of facts, and the results 
may be verified easily through backward traces of rule firing. 
However, the problem with analogy is that the determina-
tion of some initial similarities between a target and source 
are used as the basis for justification of further similari-
ties. Russell has identified various means by which systems 
utilizing analogical reasoning attempt to prove the correct-
ness of their results ( see Table 3) , which range from not 
providing justification at all to using implicational justifi-
cation. 62 Clearly, there . lS no common agreement as to 
resolution of the issue with regards to published research. 
Hesse called the problem of establishing the conditions under 
which this justification proceeds the 'logical problem of 
analogy'. The Scottish philosopher David Hume observed that 
inductive assertions have infinite numbers of consequences, 
but that only a finite number of confirming tests may be 
carried out63 (meaning that there can be no exhaustive proof 
for induction). There is no defined methodology yet (and may 
62Russell, p. 114. 
MMichalski, p. 87. 
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never be) for substantiating inductive theories; the closest 
that can be done is to show that the systems acts in a manner 
consistent with observed behaviors. There is also no guaran-
tee that any analogical mapping is correct. If the facts to 
be mapped from source to target were already known to be true 
in the target beforehand, or if they could be derived from the 
domain without needing either the source or target, then the 
problem would not exist. This would defeat the . primary 
purpose of predictive analogy as a useful inductive tool (and 
also degrade the importance of this capacity in the space· of 
human learning). 
Over a period of time, it would be desirable to create a 
strong domain theory from application of analogical reasoning 
which would not require the retrieval of source information to 
'fill in' the target. Implicative analogy, or definite 
analogy as termed by the Russian philosopher Uemov, provides 
certainty in a similarity X in target T from a fact in source 
Q if the premise VxlP(x) => Q(x) holds. 64 This does provide 
rigorous justification for deductive analogy. Greiner takes 
a different approach, one more suited to this paper, that 
conclusions by analogy are not capable of being deduced from 
the initial target description, since it is rarely complete. 
This would indicate that justification cannot be proven, since 
it must be proven that the conclusions follow directly from 
64Russell, p. 24. 
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the premises .. 65 By all appearances, the justification 
problem will continue to be an integral part of the nature of 
analogy. 
65 b. d I 1 , p. 24. 
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Type of Justification 
No justification 
Similarity 
Induction over 
similarities 
Implicational justifi-
cation 
Determinations 
Description 
Inferences allowed by the 
theory are essenially uncon-
strained. 
Theories that infer further 
similarities based on the 
amount of exising similarity 
Uncommon but interesting idea 
Essentially, given facts P(S), 
P(T), Q(S), allow inference Q(T) when and only when the 
rule VxlP(x) => Q(x) already known. 
Forms of weak knowledge 
Table 3 - Russell's Classes of Justification~ 
66 b. d . I 1 , p. 114. 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has intended to provide an overview of current 
thought in inductive theories and systems . using analogy. 
There has been growing interest in computational analogical 
reasoning since the time of Kling's ZORBA system (1971) and 
doubtless will continue into the 21st century. The desire to 
model human cognition processes has been active much longer 
than the efforts to transform these theories into working 
systems, of course. Between the interest in expanding 
comprehension of the mind and a hunger to find better knowl-
edge acquisition facilities for expert systems, the process of 
analogy is a promising pathway to be explored. There has been 
sufficient evidence in psychology and philosophy to determine 
that analogy plays an important part in solving problems. The 
problem is that analogy has not yet been bounded by any single 
comprehensive, successful theory or working model. This lack 
of understanding hinders the expedient development of produc-
tion systems using this type of inductive reasoning. 
There appears to be a focusing of thought regarding 
theoretical modeling of analogical . reasoning in terms of 
computational strategies. First, many of the recent works 
accept the usage of domain knowledge as a vital component in 
defining interrelationships between data elements. Secondly, 
the priority of goal-related data (causal relations) over 
other types of data in the target with respect to improving 
the quality of the source selection as well as constraining 
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the search . is gathering more support from researchers. 
Thirdly, the semantics of a problem are being recognized as 
having as much bearing, if not more, than the surface charac-
teristics on the construction of a reliable model to be used 
in the source selection. Fourth, many researchers are openly 
acknowledging that the mapping process, initial and extensive, 
will often be less than perfect, and strategies for dealing 
with partial similarities are being formulated in response. 
Fifth, the creation of abstractions that provide some manner 
of dealing with interdomain source selection, which are 
particularly hazardous due to the lack of obvious surface 
. . 
similarity, are being investigated as a promising avenue. 
Lastly, the realization that inductive reasoning, including 
analogy, cannot be easily justified except in trivial situa-
tions (as in implicative analogy) does not make it any easier 
to defend the use of analogical techniques, but it allows 
concentration on finding solutions that are consistent with 
observable behavior of known examples. 
The state of expert systems design has reached a point 
where the greatest constraining factor is the limitation of 
human capacities: the inability of the expert to rec~ll his 
problem-solving behavior in response to certain conditions; 
the extensive time required by the knowledge engineer to 
comprehend and extract the information from the expert for 
encoding it into a knowledge base and rule set; and the effort 
required to maintain a working system with extensions to the 
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original logic. These considerations have provoked research 
into sophisticated mechanical knowledge acquisition tools. 
Still, if the domain expert cannot construct his thought 
processes in a form which the knowledge acquisition methodolo-
gy can accept, then analogy becomes an alternative method for 
helping to construct the domain knowledge base. Also, because 
analogy bases its premises on the same data that is being used 
by human experts, the system is less likely to forget some 
. 
related piece of data which . lS crucial to making the 
source/target match work. 
In conclusion, artificial intelligence is preparing to 
enter a new, exciting phase. The first phase saw the culmina-
tion of years of research into the feasibility of capturing a 
human domain expert's knowledge in the development of produc-
tion-level knowledge bases and expert systems. The next phase 
intends to find ways of applying learning techniques to 
machines in order to expedite and improve the quality of 
knowledge transfer. The result of these efforts will be 
systems that can self-correct on the basis of newly-learned 
behaviors and techniques. Analogy is an important learning 
mechanism in human cognition, and it will also doubtless 
become a part of the AI systems toolkit. It is not intended 
to function as the only nor the best methodology for machine 
learning, but use of it's strengths properly will allow it to 
complement other deductive and inductive paradigms very 
effectively. The progress of computational analogic reasoning j 
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will provide for and benefit from the progress in understand-
ing the human mind's capacity for using analogy. The creation 
of the mythical 'thinking machine' lies some distance in the 
future. To this end, development and implementation of robust 
automated analogic reasoning mechanisms places man one step 
closer to that goal and, at the same time, places him one step 
closer to knowing himself. 
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